General Revelation

by Dr. Doug Bookman

The story is told of a traveler who was making his way through the backroads of Virginia when he came across a farmhouse with an advertisement in the front yard which read:

Laying aside for a moment (for the sake of our story) the apocryphal nature of that account, the traveller approached the farmer and inquired as to whether the item was in fact the original hatchet of young George. The farmer insisted it was indeed, but then in a moment of typical Yankee transparency, admitted, "Well, of course it has had six new handles and seven new heads, but it's still the original hatchet!"

It is my observation that the theological category denominated General Revelation has fallen prey to a fate similar to that of George Washington's hatchet. Or, to multiply my analogies, the concept is a bit like that man in our Lord's parable who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell among thieves, and was stripped of all his goods--the point being that the term general revelation, which has enjoyed currency in the theological world for centuries, has in our day been stripped of all its goods--it stands fairly eviscerated.

The concept has endured a remarkably mercurial evolution even in the last century: that which the term is intended to connote has been again and again modified and amplified; various elements of the concept have been de- and then re- and then again de-emphasized; at times that which lies at the very heart of the concept has been relegated to entirely ancillary status, while elements which are in fact foreign to the term have been in the minds of some appended to the conept. Given such vicissitudes of definition,¹ the hatchet only haltingly resembles the archetype from which it is descended. And thus (to press the figure well beyond what may be reasonably expected of any analogy), the theologian wielding this conceptual hatchet is unable to cut very finely, and he is as likely as not to chop off his own thumb!

Anyone who is attuned to the issues related to the doctrine of general revelation will recognize that much of this difficulty of definition has arisen from the fact that the concept of natural theology is often confused with, if not entirely identified with, the concept of general revelation. To sort these issues out entirely, either as to what constitutes orthodox theology or as to the history of doctrine, lies beyond the scope of the present endeavor.² It would be timely, however, to posit one proposition in this regard, the force of which will become evident in the course of the paper. That proposition is simply this: that the category natural theology is not synonymous with the category general revelation.³ natural theology. The discussion which follows proceeds upon that assumption.

Rather than an exhaustive study of the general revelation, I have chosen to approach the issue by means of a "test case." Specifically, I would like to consider the theological category general revelation in the context of the integrationist endeavor. That is, in the (very noble) attempt to properly taxonomize the authority of truth-claims made by various secular disciplines and the authority of truth-claims derived from Scripture and/or theology, appeal is often made to a perceived category denominated general revelation. That appeal is very strategic in the effort to define a construct within which to pursue the integrationist effort. Further, the construct which issues from an appeal to general revelation is often referred to as the "Two-Book" approach, those two "books" being general revelation and special revlation. In the balance of this paper, I will define and critique that "Two-Book" approach--and as I do so the primary emphasis will be upon the part played in that approach by so-called general revelation.

The "two-book" fallacy may be reduced to the following propositions:
THE AXIOMATIC ASSERTION:
All truth is God's truth.

THE THEOLOGICAL FORMULATION:⁴
God has made Himself known via two channels: special revelation and general revelation.

Special revelation is the propositional truth recorded in Scripture;

General revelation is non-propositional truth which is deposited by God in the created order of things and which must be investigated and discovered by man.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCLUSION:
Although the two channels of truth are distinguishable, both are in fact revelatory; thus truth accurately derived from the consideration of the natural order of things (general revelation) is just as "true" as that derived from Scripture.

THE INTEGRATIONIST RAMIFICATION:
Any defensible truth which is derived by means of psychological research into the order of humanity is truth derived from general revelation, thus truth derived from God, and thus truth as dependable and authoritative as truth exegeted from Scripture.

Consider just a sampling of the expressions of this basic element found in discussions of proper Christian epistemology. James D. Guy, Jr, in an article entitled "The Search for Truth in the Task of Integration" states,

If integration is conceptualized as the search for truth concerning human nature, and God is identified as the source of this truth, the next logical issue involves the revelation of this truth. It has traditionally been held that God reveals this truth to us through both general and special revelation, with both nature and the Bible serving as expressions or representations of this truth. The disciplines of psychology and theology are attempts to discover and systematize truth by means of the study of the natural sciences and biblical revelation.

Again, Fleck and Carter are quite explicit in this regard.

Since God is the creator of the universe, all principles and laws have their origin in him. What is often called "nature" in science or philosophy is in reality God's creation. As his creation, nature and its laws reveal the Creator. Hence, theologians have referred to the picture of God in nature as general revelation because nature reveals God as a powerful and orderly creator. On the other hand, God is revealed in the Scripture and in Jesus Christ in a special way, i.e., special or particular details about God's person, nature, and his plan for human life and its relationship with him are revealed in Scripture. Hence, theologians refer to Scripture as special revelation.

R. L. Timpe lays the same foundational rationale for the integration of theology and psychology.

The task of integration involves an explicit relating of truth gleaned from general or natural revelation to that derived from special or biblical revelation, of interrelating knowledge gained from the world and knowledge gained from the Word....The integration movement offers a rapprochement by proposing the adoption of two premises:
1) God is the source of all truth no matter where it is found;
2) God is the source of all truth no matter how it is found.

In the same vein, Ellens criticizes the "essentially American-Fundamentalist notion that truth comes only through the Christian Scriptures" because he feels it "devalues God's General Revelation in the world studied by the natural and social sciences" and thus "suggests that science, our reading of God's book in nature, is at war with the Christian Religion, our reading of God's other book, the Scriptures." Later in the same article Ellens avers,

Theology and Psychology are both sciences in their own right, stand legitimately on their own foundations, read carefully are the two books of God's Revelation. They are not alien in any inherent sense....

Wherever truth is disclosed it is always God's truth. Whether it is found in General Revelation or Special Revelation, it is truth which has equal warrant with all other truth. Some truth may have greater weight than other truth in a specific situation, but there is no difference in its warrant as truth.

Citations might be multiplied almost endlessly, but perhaps these will suffice to demonstrate the nature and importance of this specific rationale.

The Argument Critiqued

The general revelation vis a vis special revelation argument is appealed to in the integrationist epistemological construct to support the proposition that integration can and should be done. However, that argument is crippled by the fact that the definition which is assigned the phrase "general revelation," and which is so foundational to the argument erected upon this term, is confused and erroneous on two counts: first it misdefines the term "revelation," and second it misdefines the term "general."

The term "revelation" is misdefined. With reference to the term "revelation," this argument is flawed in that it neglects an element which is necessary to the Biblical concept, namely, that revelation is by definition non-discoverable by human investigation or cogitation.

This is the teaching of Scripture regarding God's communication of truth which we know as "revelation" (Isa 55:9; 1 Cor 2:11-14; 1 Tim 6:15,16; 2 Pet 1:19-21), and that teaching has been acknowledged and cherished by evangelical theologians. Chafer distinguishes sharply between reason and revelation, asserting that "revelation by its nature transcends the human capacity to discover and is a direct communication from God concerning truths which no person could discover by himself". Erickson succinctly defines revelation as "[t]he making known of that which is unknown; the unveiling of that which is veiled". Bancroft characterizes revelation as "that act of God by which He communicates to the mind of man truth not known before and incapable of being discovered by the mind of man unaided". Thiessen emphasizes that same element of revelation in his definition: "By revelation we mean that act of God whereby He discloses Himself or communicates truth to the mind; whereby He makes manifest to His creatures that which could not be known in any other way". Unger emphasizes this matter as well, characterizing the term "revelation" as "expressive of the fact that God has made known to men truths and realities which men could not discover for themselves". And Pache labors to make the point that "revelation is of necessity an act of God."

Over against this concept is the view native to the Two-Book theory that general revelation is truth which God has imbedded in the natural order and which man is responsible to extract from that order by investigation and cogitation. William F. English avers that

...the truths of general revelation are not delineated for us by God. Instead, they are "discovered" by fallible humans. At this point, it does not matter whether the "explorer" is a Christian or an atheist. Truths discovered in general revelation must be studied and examined for their trustworthiness, regardless of the religious beliefs of the giver.

So there are two very different models of revelation before the house: one posits that God has made known certain truths to man, which truths man could never have discovered for himself; the other understands that God has somehow imbedded a myriad of truths in the natural order and that man is capable of and responsible to ferret out those truths.

Now it is at this point that the intent of my argument is most liable to misunderstanding and thus must be very carefully understood. For the record, I will enthusiastically affirm each of the following propositions:

1. that God is the Author and Sustainer of the created order;
2. that there are facts and realities and truths which by means of human investigation and cogitation are to be discovered in the created order, both natural and human;
3. that the possibility exists that such humanly discovered and verified facts and realities are no less true than truth communicated directly by God;
4. that many of the facts and verities thus discovered by man's investigation into the created order can be employed to help people in many ways.

The issue, then, is not whether it is possible that truth might be discovered by human investigation of the natural and moral universe; rather, the issue is WHETHER TRUTH THUS DISCOVERED CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE CATEGORY OF GENERAL REVELATION.

My contention is that by reason of the proper definition of the theological category "general revelation" and by reason of the intrinsic and divine integrity and authority which must be granted to any truth-claim which is placed under that category, it is erroneous and misleading to assign to that category humanly deduced and/or discovered facts and theories. The issue is larger than appropriate taxonomy. In fact, to assign such humanly determined truths to the category of general revelation introduces a two-fold fallacy into the argument when it is used as a rationale for the integrationist position.

First, there is the fallacy which might be termed falsely perceived validity. Revelation is from God; thus it is by definition true and authoritative. To assign man's discoveries to the category of general revelation is to imbue them with an aura of validity and consequent authority which they do not, indeed, they cannot merit. Thus, to assign a concept to the category of "general revelation" when that concept is in fact a theory concocted by man is in effect to lend God's name to man's ideas. That is fallacious, no matter the intrinsic truth or falsehood of the theory under consideration.

The second fallacy involved in thus construing as general revelation those perceived truths which are discovered by man might be called crippled accountability. That is, once it is acknowledged that these theories are revelatory in nature, the issue of challenging them becomes moot. Much may be said about testing the ideas thus derived before acknowledging them as part of that august body of truth which God has communicated in the natural order of things, or about honoring the distinction in intrinsic authority between general and special revelation; but to craft an argument for integration based upon the equal merits and authority of general revelation and special revelation is functionally to short-circuit such efforts and to deny such distinctions. Very simply, if it is revelation, then God said it; if God said it, then it is true; when God speaks truth, man's responsibility is not to test that truth but to obey it. It is self-contradictory to insist that general revelation can include truths which must be "studied and examined for their trustworthiness."

In summary, then, the integrationist rationale which arises from the claim that perceived truths established by human research constitute a sub-set of the category general revelation, and thus possess the authority and dependability native to revelation, is flawed first of all in its misdefinition of the term "revelation". Inherent to the biblical concept of revelation is the idea of non-discoverability, but the most dominant element of general revelation as construed in this rationale is that the facts to be granted the status of revelation are by definition the result of human research and observation.

The term "general" misdefined. Second, the "two-book" theory is flawed in its misdefinition of the term "general". In the articulation of the "two-book" argument, it is clear from the use to which the term "general" is put, and sometimes from the accompanying explication and application of the concept, that the term is to be taken to signify "generic, non-specific as to category or verifiability, cutting across a broad spectrum of loosely related topics". (This in contrast to "special" revelation, which term is conceived to connote "narrow or specific as to category and focus, dealing with but one category.")

According to Fleck and Carter, for instance, general revelation is so called because it communicates the "picture of God in nature". The contrast to special revelation is represented thus: "God is revealed in the Scripture and in Jesus Christ in a special way, i.e., special or particular details about God's person, nature, and his plan for human life and its relationship with him are revealed in Scripture". Notice that it is because special or specific details are revealed in Scripture that "theologians refer to Scripture as special revelation."

This is a critical misunderstanding of the connotation intended for the term "general" in this phrase. It makes the referent of the descriptive force of the term to be the content of the revelation thus described. In fact, as the term "general revelation" is historically and universally employed in evangelical theology, the term "general" is intended to characterize not the CHARACTER OF REVELATION under discussion but the AUDIENCE to whom that revelation is available. Ryrie describes the "Characteristics of General Revelation" as follows:

General revelation is exactly that--general. It is general in its scope; that is, it reaches to all people (Matt 5:45; Acts 14:17). It is general in geography; that is, it encompasses the entire globe (Ps 19:2). It is general in its methodology; that is, it employs universal means like the heat of the sun (vv. 4-6) and human conscience (Rom 2:14-15). Simply because it is a revelation that thus affects all people wherever they are and whenever they have lived it can bring light and truth to all, or if rejected, brings condemnation.

So general revelation is general not because it deals with a broad and non-specific (that is, general) category of facts, but because it is accessible to all men of all time (that is, to men generally).

Again, special revelation is so-called not because it makes known "special or particular details about God's person, nature, and his plan for human life", but because it is made known not generally but to specific individuals. Thiessen distinguishes special revelation as "those acts of God whereby He makes Himself and His truth known at special times and to specific peoples". So the integrationist apologetic which takes the term general in general revelation as referring to the type of content which can be placed under that category, and therefore argues that all manner of sundry facts and realities derived by human investigation can thus be categorized, is rendered fallacious by its misdefinition of the term general. term "general" is at the heart of the axiomatic use to which the phrase is put, and it is that axiomatic force which is entirely broken by the observation that the term is being misdefined.

And that fallacy is ominous on two counts. First, it is perilous because it expands the category known as general revelation far beyond what Scripture allows. Demarest and Harpel define the extent of the truth which is divinely disclosed through the channel of general revelation as "(a) a metaphysical dualism--that a supreme Creator exists distinct from finite creatures; (b) an ethical dualism--that there is a difference between right and wrong; and (c) an epistemological dualism--that truth exists as distinct from error". It is a category carefully restricted by the teachings of Scripture, and orthodox theology has honored the Biblical bounds placed upon it. It is general in that it includes revelation available to all men, but it is not a general category sufficient to include all the discoveries and theories of human reasoning.

Again, the fallacy implicit in the definition of this term is destructive because it eviscerates the character of general revelation. That is, as described in Scripture, general revelation is truth which is manifestly set forth before all men (Rom 1:17-19; 2:14,15); it is truth so clear and irrefutable as to be known intuitively by all rational men (Ps 19:1-6; Rom 1:19); it is truth so authoritative and manifest that when men, by reason of willful rebellion, reject that truth, they do so at the cost of their own eternal damnation (Rom 1:20; 2:1,15). For this seamless, flawless and majestic tapestry of God-given truth is substituted a patchwork of "lesser" truths, of truth which "is obtainable at least in part", truths which "are not delineated for us by God" but are "discovered by fallible humans" and thus must be "studied and examined for their trustworthiness", truth the consideration of which "hopefully results in a higher level of insight and understanding". Surely such a concept of general revelation represents a ravaging of the biblical concept.

Not every integrationist apologetic employs the argument from the nature of general revelation, but most do. Further, the more thoroughly and visibly evangelical the apologist, the more likely he is to employ that argument. But it has been the contention here that the two-book approach is twice flawed. First, it is confused in its definition of the term "revelation." By defining general revelation as that body of truth which is gained by human investigation and discovery, the argument is guilty of neglecting the element of non-discoverability which is intrinsic to the biblical notion of revelation and supplanting that notion with its exact antithesis. Further, the approach is dangerous in that it attributes to the truth-claims of men an authority which they do not and cannot possess, and renders it virtually impossible to bring those truth-claims under the authority of the one standard by which God demands that they be measured.

Second, the argument from the perceived authoritative character of general revelation is confused in its definition of the term "general". By mistakenly taking that term to refer to the content of the category (rather than to the audience to which the revelation thus denominated is available), the apologists who employ this argument commit two fallacies which are destructive of orthodox theology: first, they expand the category to include all manner of truth-claims which have no right to be thus honored; and second, they eviscerate the character of revelation by including in the category truth-claims which are admittedly lesser than the truths of Scripture, which demand that finite and fallen men measure them to determine their validity, and which at best can possibly issue in a higher level of insight into the demands of living.

In summary, I am persuaded that, in the interest of validating the integrationist impulse and effort, many in the Christian community have, wittingly or unwittingly, exchanged the biblical doctrine of general revelation for one of their own making. It is my persuasion that the evangelical world is entirely the loser in the bargain.